We studied the distribution of WWI fighter pilots by the number of victories they were credited with along with casualty reports. Using the maximum entropy method we obtained the underlying distribution of pilots by their skill. We find that the variance of this skill distribution is not very large, and that the top aces achieved their victory scores mostly by luck. For example, the ace of aces, Manfred von Richthofen, most likely had a skill in the top quarter of the active WWI German fighter pilots, and was no more special than that. When combined with our recent study [10] , showing that fame grows exponentially with victory scores, these results (derived from real data) show that both outstanding achievement records and resulting fame are mostly due to chance.
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During the "Manhattan project" (the making of nuclear bomb), physicist Enrico Fermi asked General Leslie Groves, the head of the project, what is the definition of a "great" general [1] . Groves replied that any general who had won five battles in a row might safely be called great. Fermi then asked how many generals are great. Groves said about three out of every hundred. Fermi conjectured that if the chance of winning one battle is 1/2 then the chance of winning five battles in a row is 32 1 2 1 5 = . "So you are right, General, about three out of every hundred. Mathematical probability, not genius."
Similarly to a great general, an ace is a fighter pilot who achieved five or more victories. Can the latter be explained by simple probability, like the former? At first glance this does not appear to be so, as some aces scored way too many victories. For example, the probability to achieve by pure chance Manfred von Richthofen's 80 victories is 24 80
. One is tempted to conclude that highscoring aces had outstanding skills.
A more careful analysis proves this conclusion wrong. During WWI British Empire Air Forces fully credited their pilots for moral 1 victories (Ref. [2] , p.6). It is not that unlikely to achieve five moral victories if you can have five moral defeats in between. In addition British Air Force fully credited their pilots for shared victories (Ref. [2] , p.8). That is if e.g. three British airplanes shot one German airplane -all three were credited with a victory. The French did not count moral victories, but allowed for shared ones (Ref. [3] , p.6). The Americans were either under French or British command and had the corresponding rules applied to them. In contrast, the Germans had ideal scoring system (Ref. [4] , p.6-7). They did not count moral victories. The opponent aircraft had to be either destroyed or forced to lend on German territory and its crew taken prisoners. They did not allow shared victories as well 2 . This was in theory. In practice, however, military historians "have found a number of 'victories' where, say, three Allied aircraft have been claimed and credited when there is absolutely no doubt that only one or two of those Allied planes were lost" (Ref. [4] , p.7). This means that in reality some moral or shared victories were counted by the Germans.
Ref. [5] contains the list of all German WWI fighter pilots, with all of their victories and casualties. The total number of credited victories is 6759 3 . The number of casualties, however, is a lot smaller 4 . They amount to 618 KIA (killed in action), 52 WIA/DOW (wounded in action and later died of wounds), 140 POW (prisoner of war), and 431 WIA (wounded in action and survived). According to the official German scoring system, for a pilot to be credited with a victory his opponent should be killed or taken prisoner. Let us compute the number of defeats suffered by the Germans using their own scoring system for victories. Obviously, KIA, WIA/DOW, and POW should be counted as defeats. These add up to 810. This is by a factor of 8.3 less than the number of credited victories. We are not supposed to include WIA in defeats if we wish to follow the German scoring system. However, even if we count all of the WIA as defeats we get 1,241 defeats, which is still by a factor of 5.4 less than the number of credited victories.
We don't know for sure why the number of victories exceeds the number of casualties by such a large factor, but can suggest several possible reasons:
• Moral and shared victories.
• Aces flew fighter-planes, while their opponents often were less well armed aircraft.
• German Air Force fought mostly defensive war behind their front lines [4] . So, if a German aircraft was shot down, it could land on their territory. In contrast, when Allied aircraft was shot down, it had to land on the enemy territory and its pilot was taken prisoner. • The Germans were better.
Fortunately, we don't need to know the exact reason to compare German fighter pilots between themselves. Let us, given the statistics of defeats and victories, compute the probability to get Richthofen's score. German pilots were credited with 6759 victories (this number probably includes moral and shared victories). Germans also recorded 810 defeats. The total number of engagements was probably not 6759 + 810, but 6759 + 810 + X. Here X is the unknown number of moral defeats. As long as moral defeat does not affect the ability of a pilot to participate in further battles we don't need to know X. We will call a "recorded engagement" an engagement which resulted in either credited victory or in a defeat. The rate of defeat in recorded engagements is 107 . 0 810 6759
. The probability of 80 victories in a row is ( )
The probability that at least one of 2894
German fighter pilots will achieve 80 or more victories is ( )
Richthofen's score is thus within the reach of chance. We can also compute the probability distribution of the victory scores, assuming that everyone fights until he gets killed. The probability to win n fights and lose the next is: mechanism. However, we have no evidence that this practice was widespread, and will ignore its effect in this study.
( ) ( ) r r n P n − = 1
(1) Figure 1 shows the result of Eq.(1) (with
) compared with the actual distribution of the victory scores (which are given in Table 1 ). While the agreement is not perfect, it is clear that chance can account for most of the variance in the numbers of victories.
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If the distribution of the innate defeat rates is ( ) In general, the probability distribution of defeat rates of pilots, surviving n fights, is 
and the rate of defeat in nth fight is:
Similarly, the probability that a randomly selected pilot wins n battles and loses the next is:
Now the probability to get the whole set of data in Table 1 is given by the likelihood function:
are the numbers of undefeated and defeated pilots with n victories. We should find the distribution ( ) r p which maximize this function. In computations it is more convenient to work with the logarithm of the likelihood function:
The distribution, ( ) r p , obtained by maximizing f (see the Appendix) is shown in Fig. 3 by rhombs. It looks irregular.
The maximum likelihood estimation we just performed assumed that all possible distributions, ( ) r p , are, a priori, equally probable. The Maximum Entropy Principle [7] provides a more reasonable way of assigning a priori probabilities to distributions. As we are inferring a probability distribution then the relevant entropy is the information (Shannon) entropy [8]:
A priori probability of a given probability distribution, ( ) r p , is s e ∝ [7] . The combined probability of realizing a particular distribution and that this distribution produces the observed data is
This is the quantity which should be maximized, or, alternatively, its logarithm, ( ) s f + ln , which is more convenient. The result of this maximization is shown in Fig. 3 Now we can use ( ) r p to do Bayesian inference [6] for intrinsic defeat rate of any given pilot (including those who were never defeated 5 ). We will use ( ) r p as a prior distribution of defeat rate and will make an estimate of pilot's defeat rate based on this prior distribution and actual number of fights he won and lost. For example, if we don't know how many fights a pilot had won, then all we can say is that the probability distribution of his defeat rate is ( ) r p . If we know that he won n fights, then the probability distribution of his defeat rate is the probability distribution of defeat rates of pilots, who won n fights, which is given by Eq.(2). The same inference for defeat rate for pilots, who won n fights and were defeated in the next, can be obtained similarly: (6) 5 Similar approach was previously used to estimate the true dropped calls rates when no dropped calls happened during the test [9] .
The inference for five representative pilots, computed using Eqs. (2) and (6) is given in Fig. 4 . In particular, Manfred von Richthofen most likely had the intrinsic defeat rate of 2.5%. According to the distribution of intrinsic defeat rates shown in Fig. 3 about 27% of pilots have the defeat rate of 2.5% or lower. This means that MvR is most likely merely in top 27% according to his skill. Note that we completely neglected the effects of learning in our analysis. It is clear that at least part of the variation in perceived ability is due to the fact that pilots are getting more experienced as they participate in more and more fights. Thus taking into account the effects of learning will make the variance in innate ability only less. Consequently, our estimate of the uniqueness of MvR is an upper bound. In our previous paper on the theory of aces [10] we found a strong correlation between the logarithm of fame (measured in numbers of Google hits) and the achievement (number of victories), suggesting that fame grows exponentially with achievement. In other words fame gives increasing return on achievement, but still is determined by this achievement. This would be acceptable if achievement was proportional to skill. However, now we have shown that the difference in the number of victories is mostly due to chance. This means that the fame in the end is due to chance. There were a couple of papers ( [11] , [12] ) which speculated, using arguments akin to the one by Fermi in the beginning of the article, that people can be perceived as having extraordinary ability when in reality they are simply lucky. However, this paper is the first one, which argues it using real data.
